Introduction
This chapter provides a brief overview of the main competences of the EU, as well as the tools and processes the EU has to translate these competences into legal action. In other words, what may the EU actually do, and how does it act?1 In addition, this chapter touches on a question that is increasingly important for the EU, certainly after Brexit, and that may become of increasing importance to the EAC as well: variable geometry. To what extent can integration differ per Member State or per group of Member States, or must all states integrate at the same pace? We begin, however, with the question which competences the EU actually has, and how competence can be determined in a concrete case.
Conferral, Scope, Nature and Use of EU Competences
Fundamentally, the EU remains an organization established by its Member States. Consequently, the EU does not have a general competence to act in whatever field it wants to. In EU-speak, this is often summarized by saying the EU has no Kompetenz-Kompetenz.2 Instead, the EU only has those powers conferred on it by the Member States via the different Treaties.3 All powers that have not been transferred to the EU remain with the Member States.4
The basic principle of conferred powers is laid down in Articles 4, 5(1) and (2) TEU, which provide that:
1.
The If the EU wants to act in a certain field, therefore, it must first have received the competence from the Member States to do so. Concretely, this delegation of competences in the Treaties is done via legal basis provisions. These are provisions in the TEU or TFEU that explicitly give the EU the competence to act in a certain field, and that also indicate the legislative process the EU should follow to adopt such acts.5 These legal bases can be very limited and specific, such as Article 157(3) TFEU, which only allows the EU to regulate in the field of sex equality in employment and occupation:
The European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, shall adopt measures to ensure the application of the principle of equal opportunities and equal treatment of men and women in matters of employment and occupation, including the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value.
Other legal bases, however, are very open and wide-ranging. Article 114 TFEU on the creation of the internal market, the most important legal basis in EU law, provides a good example of such a broad legal basis. Article 26 TFEU states that EU should create one internal market.6 This provision itself, however, only provides the objective of creating a market. It does not provide a legal basis to turn this objective into reality by adopting legal acts. This legal basis can be found in the first paragraph of Article 114 TFEU: Save where otherwise provided in the Treaties, the following provisions shall apply for the achievement of the objectives set out in Article 26. The European Parliament and the Council shall, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure and after consulting the Economic and Social Committee, adopt the measures for the approximation of the provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action in Member States which have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal market.
Article 114 TFEU, therefore, empowers the EU to adopt legislation to harmonize all national laws that may hinder the free movement of goods, services, capital or people and therefore obstruct the internal market. Such a far-reaching power of course also raises the question where the limits of EU competences lie, and who gets to decide on these limits. After all, as we know from the Commerce Clause in the US Constitution, almost anything can be said to affect the internal market, as almost all rules will have some (indirect) effect on cross-border-trade.7 Once we have established that the EU has been attributed a certain power, like regulating the internal market, we must then answer the additional question where the limits of this power lie.
The Scope of EU Competences
Crucially, when it comes to delineating EU competences, the line judge is the CJEU, and not the Member States or the EU legislative institutions.8 Even though the EU does not have Kompetenz-Kompetenz, it is an EU institution that determines the scope of the competences that have been conferred by the Member States.9 This exclusive power of the CJEU to determine competence is important for the stability and effectiveness of the EU. Just imagine if each individual Member State or national court would be able to decide, for every single peace of EU legislation, whether the act was ultra vires or not. Similarly, the review by the EU Courts, and not the EU political institutions, also means that the EU political institutions must respect the nature and limits of EU competences as well.
In determining the scope of EU competences, the CJEU follows a teleological, or purposeful approach. It looks at the objectives and ambitions of the EU, and interprets EU competences in such a way that these objectives may be realized.10 The main argument is that the Member States intended to give the EU the necessary powers to realize its objectives, as it were the same Member States that formulated these objectives in the first place. The result of this teleological approach is that the CJEU often chooses a rather expansive interpretation that increases EU competences. The best example of this purposeful approach, and its expansive effects, is the (in)famous Tobacca Advertising case law.11
The tobacco cases concerned a directive prohibiting all advertising and sponsorship of tobacco products.12 The main legal basis for this act was the internal market clause of Article 114 paragraph 1 TFEU.13 The Council, the European Parliament and the Commission claimed that the many differences in national laws on tobacco advertising were a threat to the internal market. If Italy allowed tobacco advertising but Sweden did not, for example, Italian newspapers or journals with tobacco advertisements could not be sold in Sweden, hindering their free movement. Germany, however, claimed that the real objective of the directive was to reduce smoking and protect public health. This was problematic according to Germany because the EU only has very limited competences in the field of public health. In fact, Article 168(5) TFEU explicitly prohibits harmonization in the field of public health, even though it also does obligate the EU to ensure 'a high level of human health protection' in all Union policies and activities.14 10 S. In two landmark judgments the CJEU first held that the directive did exceed the competence under Article 114 TFEU as it was overly broad. For example, it also included advertisements on objects that would never cross the border.15 An amended directive, however, which excluded these objects, was later upheld by the CJEU. These judgments contain two key findings concerning the delineation of EU competences. The first is the low threshold the CJEU requires before allowing the use of Article 114 TFEU. The second is that, once this low threshold has been met, EU measures based on the market competence of Article 114 TFEU may also, or even predominantly pursue other objectives, including public health. The reasoning of the CJEU here is exemplary and an important window into the logic of effectiveness that shapes EU law and contributes to its actual success. The CJEU first reiterates the fundamental principle of attribution:
Those provisions, read together, make it clear that the measures referred to in Article [114(1)] of the Treaty are intended to improve the conditions for the establishment and functioning of the internal market. To construe that article as meaning that it vests in the Community legislature a general power to regulate the internal market would not only be contrary to the express wording of the provisions cited above but would also be incompatible with the principle embodied in Article [5 TEU] that the powers of the Community are limited to those specifically conferred on it.
Moreover, a measure adopted on the basis of Article The CJEU therefore insists that a measure can only be based on a legal basis if it 'genuinely' pursues the objective behind that legal basis, which it is for the Court to assess. Both in Tobacco Advertising I and in Tobacco Advertising II, however, the CJEU subsequently held that there was a sufficient risk to free movement, now or in the future, to justify the use of Article 114 as a legal basis:
It is clear that, as a result of disparities between national laws on the advertising of tobacco products, obstacles to the free movement of goods or the freedom to provide services exist or may well arise.
In the case, for example, of periodicals, magazines and newspapers which contain advertising for tobacco products, it is true, as the applicant has demonstrated, that no obstacle exists at present to their importation into Member States which prohibit such advertising. However, in view of the trend in national legislation towards ever greater restrictions on advertising of tobacco products, reflecting the belief that such advertising gives rise to an appreciable increase in tobacco consumption, it is probable that obstacles to the free movement of press products will arise in the future.17
The EU therefore has a competence to regulate under Article 114(1) TFEU where there is an actual or potential obstacle, now or in the future to any of the fundamental freedoms.18 Even the risk of potential future obstacles, therefore, is sufficient to create a competence under Article 114 TFEU.
Once this already low threshold for the use of Article 114 TFEU has been met, moreover, the CJEU held that the EU was also allowed to pursue other objectives than the internal market, including public health:19 Furthermore, provided that the conditions for recourse to Articles [114], 57(2) and 66 as a legal basis are fulfilled, the Community legislature cannot be prevented from relying on that legal basis on the ground that public health protection is a decisive factor in the choices to be made. On the contrary, the third paragraph of Article129 (1) The expansive interpretation of competences followed by the CJEU has of course been criticized in many Member States, and one could say that the CJEU comes close to granting a general competence under Article 114 TFEU.27 At the same time, the purposeful approach of the CJEU has been vital for enabling the EU and allowing it to be effective. As it only has a limited number of competences, these competences need to provide sufficient space for the EU to actually achieve its aims.28 Moreover, it must also not be forgotten that it is the political institutions, including the Member States as represented in the Council of Ministers, that first adopt legal acts, and hence are of the opinion that these acts fit within a certain competence. The CJEU only reviews these acts once adopted. It is not the CJEU, therefore, that expands EU law all by itself, but rather the CJEU that empowers the political institutions to achieve EU objectives by following a purposive and permissive doctrine of competences.
The Nature of EU Competences
In addition to establishing the existence and the scope of EU competences, it is also important to understand the different types of EU competence. For the EU has three different types of competences, being exclusive competences, shared competences and supporting competences. In these areas, such as the customs union or the common commercial policy, it was deemed necessary to have one coherent EU policy. For example, the EU customs union can only work effectively if all Member States use the exact same rules and rates. Similarly, the common commercial policy (CCCP) requires the EU to act as a single block externally. The effectiveness of this policy would be undermined if Member States could also negotiate trade deals bilaterally. Hence the decision was taken to create exclusive competences in these fields.
3.2.2.2
Shared Competences The second, and largest group of competences are shared. As their name already indicates, these competences are shared between the EU and the Member States. This means that both the EU and the Member States are allowed to act in areas of shared competence. Article 4 TFEU provides an overview of the many and broad shared competences of the EU:
1.
The One of the most successful examples of a supporting competence is the Erasmus programme allowing students to study abroad. The area of education is so sensitive and connected to national identity that the EU has received no competences to harmonize. The EU, therefore, cannot regulate curricula or school systems. The EU has, however, received the competence to support and supplement national education policy, for example by providing subsidies to certain programmes, or sharing best practises between Member States. The Erasmus programme is one example of such supporting action.
3.2.2.4
The Residual Competence of Article 352 TFEU Article 352 TFEU forms an intriguing and important addition to the entire system of EU competences. It provides a residual competence where the Treaties do provide an objective but, even under the expansive interpretation of the CJEU, no competence can be found in any of the legal basis provisions:
If action by the Union should prove necessary, within the framework of the policies defined in the Treaties, to attain one of the objectives set out in the Treaties, and the Treaties have not provided the necessary powers, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament, shall adopt the appropriate measures. Where the measures in question are adopted by the Council in accordance with a special legislative procedure, it shall also act unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.32
Besides an interesting legal conundrum, Article 352 TFEU creates a form of residual competence to ensure that objectives can be realized, and hence further ensures EU effectiveness.33 Here the EU system for attribution again has similarities to the federate US approach under the necessary and proper clause.34 Article 352 TEU in fact even goes one step further, as the text of the necessary and proper clause only refers to the powers of the federal government, not the objectives.
The use of Article 352 TFEU, however, does require unanimity in the Council, which of course limits its use. In addition, because of its openness, some, including the Bundesverfassungsgericht, see it as a limited form of amendment, and hence require approval by the German parliament for any use of Article 352, further complicating the use of this residual competence.35
The Use of EU Competences: The Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality
Having a competence does not automatically mean that you should also use it, or use it to its fullest extent. Once it is established that the EU has a certain competence, therefore, two new questions arise: 1) when should the EU use a certain competence, and 2) how far should the EU go when using that competence? These questions are governed by the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. Under the principle of subsidiarity the EU 'shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States.'36 Even if there is a competence, EU action is only called for where the Member States cannot achieve a similar result themselves. Although subsidiarity is a legal principle, it is highly political in nature, and difficult to adjudicate. The primary subsidiarity check takes place in the political 33 institutions and the national parliaments.37 The CJEU primarily checks the formal subsidiarity requirements, for example if a legislative act actually contains a paragraph assessing subsidiarity. Logically, subsidiarity only applies to shared competences and not to exclusive competences, where the Member States are no longer allowed to act anyway.
If the EU should act, the principle of proportionality demands that 'the content and form of Union action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the Treaties.'38 For example, where a limited directive harmonizing product labels for chocolate would suffice, the EU should not adopt a regulation completely regulating the manufacturing of chocolate. Like subsidiarity, the principle of proportionality is also rather political, and hence left primarily to the political institutions.39
Variable Geometry and Enhanced Cooperation
If the EU has a competence, and if it is allowed to use it, a further question that arises is if this competence may only be used where all Member States participate or if it may also be used by a smaller sub-set of Member States. This question brings us to the problem of variable geometry and flexibility. The default position is that all Member States participate in any EU action. Especially as the EU expanded, however, the need was felt for more flexibility. As with the euro, for example, some Member States wanted to integrate faster and deeper than others. How much flexibility should be allowed, and in what form, however, has always been a highly contentious point. On the one hand, it is argued that flexibility is simply necessary in so large a union. In addition, flexibility may ultimately deepen integration as it allows a 'coalition of the willing' to intensify integration in certain fields, with other Member States probably joining later. On the other hand, it is feared that a 'Europe of 37 See Protocol (No. 1) and (No. 2) on subsidiarity and the role of national parliaments that may give 'yellow' or 'orange' cards to legislative proposals where they think they infringe the principle of subsidiarity. On the complex nature of these concepts also see P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. VerLoren van Themaat, 'Introduction to the Law of the European Communities' (3rd edition, Kluwer 1998), 233 et seq. 38 Article 5(4) TEU and the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality. 39 At least in the field of competence determination. As we shall see in chapters 9-13, the CJEU does closely scrutinize proportionality where restrictions on free movement are concerned.
multiple speeds' is only the first step towards the unravelling of the EU, as it would undermine the necessary coherency and unity within the Union. In practice, a great deal of flexibility already exists in today's EU.40 Often this has been achieved by opt-outs in the Treaties, including accession treaties. For example, only 19 of the current 28 Member States participate in the Euro.41 Similarly, some Member States, notably the UK, have an opt-out for Schengen, which lifts the borders between participating states, even though some non-EU states do participate. In the larger picture, there is also the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European Free Trade Agreement (EFTA) that provide a kind of alternative membership to the EU internal market. 42 In addition to these existing forms of flexibility, Lisbon also further developed the Treaty mechanism for enhanced cooperation. 43 This mechanism allows a group of at least nine Member States to establish closer cooperation with each other within the framework of EU, and whilst using EU institutions and competences. They may only do so, however, as a last resort. This means that they must first try to achieve the desired objective with all Member States, and may only resort to enhanced cooperation where this objectively proves impossible. 44 The enhanced cooperation, furthermore, must always be open to other Member States that want to join. So far, however, this mechanism has only been used twice to adopt rules on divorce and Union patents, as the procedure is quite burdensome.
A third mechanism to allow for flexibility is to conclude international agreements between all or a group of Member States. Such agreements are often intimately connected with EU law, but formally qualify as international agreements between the Member States. The Fiscal Compact or the ESM Treaty provide clear examples of this practice, that is welcomed by some and seen as a threat to the 'Community method' by others. 45 None of these mechanisms, however, seem to provide both the flexibility that seems necessary and the safeguards that are required to guarantee the unity and stability of European integration. Especially with Brexit looming, therefore, the search is on for alternative mechanisms and models that offer both, and that may satisfy those Member States that want deeper integration and those that want to remain more on the sidelines but remain part of the EU.46 Current suggestions include, for example, the creation of several circles of integration, which range from a deeply integrated core with even a common military to less integrated 'outer circles' that primarily participate in economic integration, although it is as yet wholly unclear if it is actually feasible to separate these areas. In any event the question of flexibility and variable geometry is an important one for the EU, and will likely only increase in importance for the EAC as well. Consequently, it would seem an important area for further research and comparison.
EU Legal Instruments
Where the EU has a competence, it can only act through one of the legal instruments provided for in Article 288 TFEU, being regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations and opinions. A regulation can best be described as an EU law. From the moment of its publication a regulation applies fully and directly in all Member States. Regulations require no national implementation, rather it is even prohibited to transpose a regulation into national law. Consequently, once a regulation has been adopted and published, it is the applicable law throughout the entire EU.
A directive, on the other hand, is an indirect instrument addressed to the Member States. The directive tells Member States to achieve a certain result, for example giving a right of residence of three months to all EU citizens.47 The Member States must then implement this directive in their national law, where they are free to choose the best national means and methods of doing so. Usually, Member States are given a period of two years for this implementation. Individuals and companies subsequently rely on the national laws transposing the directive, not on the directive itself.48 The directive, therefore, is a less intrusive measure, as it allows Member States to make certain choices and to integrate a certain rule into their own national law and legal system. At the same time, directives also carry a higher risk of divergence between Member States, as the implementation may differ between Member States and as some Member States may fail to implement a directive or may implement it incorrectly.49
Decisions are legally binding acts addressed to specific addressees, and hence are not of general application. Examples are Commission decisions that grant specific farmers a subsidy or impose a fine on certain companies for violating of EU competition law. Recommendations and opinions, on the other hand, have no binding legal force. They can still have legal effect, for instance as soft law or via the principle of legitimate expectations, but are not binding as such.
EU Legislation and Decision-making
Where the EU wants to use a competence, for instance to adopt a regulation or a directive, it must act via one of the decision-making procedures provided for in the Treaty or secondary legislation.50 These procedures, therefore, regulate how the EU can act. The most important decision making procedures that will be discussed here are the ordinary legislative procedure set out in Article 294 TFEU and the two main special legislative procedures.51
48 For the complex doctrine on the potential direct effect of directives see EU chapter 4. 49 As we shall see in EU chapter 7, it is then up to the Commission to check whether a directive has been implemented correctly and to start infringement proceedings where necessary. 50 For a discussion of non-legislative decision-making within the different institutions, see chapter 2, as these procedures often entail the Institutions taking decisions on their own and under their own internal rules, such as under Articles 31 TEU or 31, 106(3), 236, 290 or 291 TFEU. The discussion here will focus on the legislative decision-making procedures. The Conciliation Committee is composed of an equal number of representatives of the Council and the European Parliament. These representatives negotiate with each other and have six weeks to arrive at a text that is acceptable for both institutions.53 The Commission also takes part in this Committee to advise and suggest possible compromises. If no compromise is reached, the act is not adopted. If a joint text can be agreed upon, however, the procedure continues to the third reading.
52 For a discussion of the qualified majority voting procedure see EU chapter 2. If the Commission has given a negative opinion on certain amendments of the European Parliament, however, the Council may only adopt these by unanimity. This requirement further safeguards the position of the Commission at this stage of the legislative procedure. 53 The representatives of the Council thereby have to approve the outcome with a qualified majority, the representatives of the Parliament by a normal majority, following the voting rules of their respective institutions.
In the third reading, the European Parliament, by normal majority, and the Council, by qualified majority, each have six weeks to either accept or reject the compromise text drafted by the Conciliation Committee, no further amendments being allowed. If one or both of the institutions reject the text, the procedure ends and no act is adopted.
The ordinary legislative procedure therefore truly casts the Council and the European Parliament as co-legislators, and also provides significant influence to the Commission. As can already be guessed from the many different rounds, however, the ordinary legislative procedure can also take quite some time. Largely for this reason, the trialogue has been invented. Essentially, the trialogue moves the Conciliation Committee up to the first round. Instead of exchanging amendments for two rounds, a Committee with representatives from the Council and the Parliament is immediately set op to negotiate a joint text. This joint text is subsequently submitted to the Council and Parliament for an up or down vote, without any further amendments being allowed. The main advantage of the trialogue is its speed, certainly when compared against a normal ordinary legislative procedure. The downsides of trialogues, however, include the reduced space for open and transparent debate, as most of the negotiation takes place behind closed doors, and no further amendments are allowed. Benefits and advantages, therefore, have to be carefully weighed in practice.
Special Legislative Procedures
In addition to the ordinary legislative procedure, there are also some special legislative procedures. The key difference between special legislative procedures and the ordinary legislative procedure is the role played by the European Parliament. In special legislative procedures the Parliament always plays a more limited role.54 The two main special legislative procedures are the Consent procedure and the Consultation procedure.
Under the Consent procedure, the European Parliament must consent to an act but does not have the power to table amendments. Formally, therefore, it can only say yes or no to the proposal on the table.55 Under the Consultation procedure, Parliament only has to be consulted, i.e. given a chance to express its view on a proposal. Parliament, however, cannot block legislation under this procedure. Usually, moreover, consent procedures require unanimity in the Council, preserving a veto for all Member States.56
Determination of Legislative Procedure and the Qualification of
Legislative Acts Which legislative procedure should be used for a specific act is determined by the legal basis. Each legal basis simply indicates the required procedure. Article 114(1) TFEU, for example, requires the ordinary legislative procedure, whereas Article 115 TFEU requires the special consultation procedure.57
The procedure used for the adoption of an act also determines its qualification as a legislative or a non-legislative act. Here again the rule is very simple. All measures adopted via the ordinary legislative procedure or a special legislative procedure qualify as legislative acts.58 This qualification is linked to the involvement of the parliament. Vice versa, all acts adopted via non-legislative procedures are non-legislative acts. This qualification is purely formal. It only depends on the procedure used, and does not look at the content of the act at all. The qualification of an act as legislative is relevant for the hierarchy of acts in the EU. Because they partake in the democratic legitimacy of the European Parliament, legislative acts are hierarchically placed above non-legislative acts. The qualification as legislative or not-legislative, moreover, is also relevant for the remedies available against an act, as will be further discussed in chapter 7.
Delegation and Implementation
Often, EU legislative acts only provide a framework that needs to be further developed or implemented. The Council and the Parliament can decide to leave this task to the Commission, for example because it requires a certain administrative expertise or because they want to focus on more high level activities. In this context the EU Treaties distinguish between delegation and implementation. Under the process of delegation a 'legislative act may delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements of the legislative act.'59 The delegated powers, however, may not concern the 'essential elements of an area' , which must be dealt with in the legislative act itself. 60 The use of delegated powers, moreover, can be subject to control by the Parliament and the Council. 61 Sometimes legislation also requires further implementation at the EU level, for instance where the Commission has to grant subsidies based on a legislative act establishing a subsidy scheme.62 To this end, a legislative act may grant implementing powers to the Commission, or less commonly to the Council. These implementing powers can be significant and far-reaching in practice. For that reason, they are usually controlled by committees of national experts, reporting back to the Council and/or the European parliament, and with different powers of checking the Commission. This entire system of committees checking the implementation of EU law by the Commission is usually referred to as Comitology. 63 The precise border between delegation and implementation can be difficult to draw in practice, as both can be very similar. For adopted acts, however, this should not create any headaches as each act is required to indicate, in its title, if it is delegated or implementing.64
